Broken Eagles

Scott has an impressive Napoleonic history library, and he's always happy to loan me his latest titles. This winter I read John Gill's substantial 2 volume history of the Confederation of the Rhine armies during the 1813 campaigns, Broken Eagles. This work is an excellent addition to his book covering the same armies during the 1809 Danube campaign, With Eagles to Glory.

Volume 1 gives a brief overview of how the Rhinebund came into being, their contingents were organized, and the invasion of Russia in 1812 to set the stage. He follows with an overview of the Spring and Autumn campaigns of 1813 before diving into the individual stories of each contingent. 

Volume 1 also covers the armies of Saxony and Bavaria, delving into organization, uniforms, and the challenges each kingdom faced in trying to rebuild their shattered armies and meet the Emperor's demands for more troops. The efforts of each kingdom to steer a middle course between the two powers is also detailed. This is followed by operational histories, following the specified contingent through the campaigns until the end. He gives detailed analysis of morale and motivation, digging into desertion statistics and how the troops responded to different leaders. Ney blaming his defeat at Dennewitz on his German troops had a significant impact on their willingness to continue dying for the Empire. Naturally a lot of time is spent on the Saxon defections at Leipzig and the causes and effects.

Volume 2 is much the same, dealing with each German state in decreasing size. There is an entire chapter on the several fortresses that contained significant German contingents in the garrisons, and used up almost 150,000 troops, without tying down significant Coalition forces. Some of these forces held out valiantly into 1814, waiting for official dispatches informing them of the change in alliance. Some Westphalian units holding on until long after their kingdom had ceased to exist.

Most of the Confederation officers, although annoyed by French demands, weren't infused with any sense of pan-Germanic loyalty. Their attachments were usually to their country and their oaths to their kings. The idea of a Germany under Prussian domination was abhorrent to them. Neutrality was never an option for the war ravaged German states, and they found the demands for troops placed upon them by the Coalition heavier than those from Napoleon. Saxon and Bavarian officers did not view 1813 as a War of Liberation, despite 19th century Prussian historians.

In many instances, at least with the larger contingents, Napoleon's German allies fought quite well. Certainly as well as the equally hastily raised and trained French regiments. Several regiments earning the esteem of their French colleagues. Saxon, Baden, and Wurttemburg cavalry were well appreciated by French commanders. The Bavarian division faithfully guarding the French baggage park for several days after Leipzig until they were officially released. 

Reading Gill's books on the Confederation of the Rhine armies always makes me annoyed at army lists that downgrade German troops. Granted the Saxon line infantry weren't up to scratch in 1809, but by 1812 they were fine. The Westphalian troops in 1813 suffered from shocking leadership,  and if your king is going to abscond to the Rhine, it's only natural for the conscripts to return home at the earliest opportunity. Especially when Westphalia was a artificial kingdom that had only been in existence for 7 years. They didn't have the regional allegiance like the other armies. A lot of wargames seem to rely too heavily on self-serving statements by Napoleon and his Marshals. Gill digs into primary sources to give us a more accurate and detailed analysis of the Confederation of the Rhine troops, who for the most part fought well and honourably.